Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty by Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag








This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret
equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain
about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide
several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-
setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a
non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consis-
tent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan
(2004)).
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11 Introduction
Strategic situations confront individuals with the delicate tasks of conjec-
turing other individuals’ decisions, that is, they face strategic uncertainty.
Naturally, individuals might rely on their prior information or knowledge in
forming their conjectures. For instance, if an individual knows that his oppo-
nents are rational, then he can infer that they will not play strictly dominated
strategies.1 Furthermore, common knowledge in rationality leads to rational-
izable conjectures (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)). Likewise, common
knowledge of conjectures, mutual knowledge of rationality and payoﬀs, and
existence of a common prior imply that conjectures form a Nash equilibrium
when viewed as mixed strategies (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)). The
aim of this paper is to introduce a new solution concept, called a minimax
regret equilibrium, which postulates neither mutual or common knowledge in
rationality nor common knowledge of conjectures.
Now, if an individual is uncertain about the rationality of his opponents,
which conjectures about his opponents’ actions should he form? This is a
very intricate issue as there is at best little to guide the individual. Ad-
mittedly, he can form a subjective probabilistic assessment and play a best
response to his assessment. However, any subjective assessment is largely ar-
bitrary, and there is no obvious reasons to favor one assessment over another.
Bayesian theory is silent on how to form initial probabilistic assessments
(Morris (1995)). Moreover, experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg’s
paradox suggests that individuals frequently experience diﬃculties in form-
ing a unique assessment. In this paper, we postulate that “regret” guides
individuals in forming probabilistic assessments and, ultimately, in making
choices. More precisely, we use the model of minimax regret with multiple
priors, recently axiomatized by Hayashi (2007a) and Stoye (2007b), to repre-
sent the preferences of individuals. In essence, the minimax regret criterion
captures the idea that individuals are concerned with foregone opportuni-
ties. Before proceeding, we wish to stress that the concern for minimizing
maximal regret does not arise from any behavioral or emotional considera-
tions. Rather, it is a consequence of relaxing some of the axioms of subjective
1In this paper, “knowledge” refers to belief with probability 1 (certainty).
2expected utility, in particular the axiom of independence to irrelevant alter-
natives. Furthermore, the behavior of an individual concerned with regret is
indistinguishable from the behavior of an individual who has formed a unique
probabilistic assessment (a Bayesian), provided that this assessment is one
that leads to maximal regret. Therefore, we may say that minimax regret
does indeed guide individuals in forming their probabilistic assessments.
While we include the case where an individual conjectures that any action
proﬁle of his opponents might be played, we allow, more generally, for con-
jectures to be constrained. For instance, conjectures might be constrained to
be correct with some minimal probability (i.e., approximate common knowl-
edge in conjectures) or consistent with almost mutual knowledge in rational-
ity. We can now provide an informal deﬁnition of our solution concept. A
proﬁle of actions is a minimax regret equilibrium if the action of a player is
optimal given his conjecture about his opponents’ play. And his conjecture
is consistent with the criterion of minimax regret and initial constraints on
conjectures. A parametric variant of special interest is called an ε-minimax
regret equilibrium. In an ε-minimax regret equilibrium, conjectures are di-
rectly related to the equilibrium actions as follows. With probability 1−ε, a
player believes (or conjectures) that his opponents will play according to the
equilibrium actions while, with probability ε, the player is completely uncer-
tain about his opponents’ play. The set of initial assessments is therefore the
ε-contamination neighborhood around the equilibrium actions. It transpires
that this parameterized version of minimax regret equilibrium is extremely
simple, tractable and insightful for economic applications.
We provide several applications of our solution concept. In particular,
we consider price-setting environments ` a la Bertrand and characterize their
ε-minimax regret equilibria. In such environments, ﬁrms face two sources of
regret. First, a ﬁrm’s price might turned out to be lower than the lowest
price of its competitors. Had the ﬁrm posted a higher price, then its proﬁt
would have been higher. Second, a ﬁrm’s price might turned out to be
higher than the lowest price of its competitors, and the regret arises from not
serving the market at all. The exposure to these two sources of regret has
important economic applications. In any ε-minimax regret equilibrium, ﬁrms
price above marginal costs and make a positive proﬁt. The intuition is simple.
3Since a ﬁrm is concerned with foregone opportunities and, in particular, with
the possibility that its competitors might price close to the monopoly price,
its optimal pricing policy reﬂects these concerns and, consequently, the price
posted is strictly above the marginal cost (in order to minimize (maximal)
regret). Moreover, as the number of ﬁrms gets larger, the pricing policy
converges to the competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, when there are at
least three ﬁrms competing in the market or costs are heterogeneous, the
equilibrium pricing policy exhibits a kink at a price close to the monopoly
price. All these equilibrium predictions agree remarkably well with empirical
and experimental observations, as documented by Baye and Morgan (2004).
Some related concepts have already appeared in the literature. The
closest is Klibanoﬀ’s (1996) concept of equilibrium with uncertainty aver-
sion. The essential diﬀerence between Klibanoﬀ’s concept and ours is that
Klibanoﬀ assumes that players conform with the maximin criterion (with
multiple priors), whereas we assume that they conform with the minimax
regret criterion. Neither we nor Klibanoﬀ assume mutual knowledge in ra-
tionality. Consequently, equilibria with uncertainty aversion as well as min-
imax regret equilibria might not be rationalizable. While conceptually very
similar, these two approaches might give very diﬀerent predictions in games,
as we will see. Another solution concept, which adopts the maximin criterion
and which is called a belief equilibrium, is oﬀered by Lo (1996). Lo’s concept
diﬀers from Klibanoﬀ’s concept and ours in that it assumes common knowl-
edge in rationality and, consequently, belief equilibria are rationalizable. It
would be straightforward to adapt Lo’s concept to the minimax regret cri-
terion, but did not choose to do it. Indeed, in a wide range of experiments
on the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, a vast majority of
subjects seems to be uncertain about the rationality of others (see Camerer
(2003, Chapter 5) for a survey and Bayer and Renou (2008) for more recent
evidence). Furthermore, a slight doubt about the rationality of others can
yield very interesting predictions in economic models e.g., price dispersion,
the existence of large and speculative trade (Neeman (1996)), just to name a
few. Another closely related concept is the concept of an ambiguous equilib-
rium (Mukerji (1995)), which adopts the concept of Choquet expected utility
and ε-ambiguous beliefs, a close relative to ε-contamination.
4While all these approaches are largely complementary and, indeed, share
similar axiomatic and epistemic foundations, we advocate in favor of the
minimax regret equilibrium. Indeed, the maximin criterion frequently often
leads to unsatisfactory predictions in strategic situations. In the price-setting
environments mentioned above, the maximin solution implies that sellers
price at the marginal cost and make zero proﬁt (the Bertrand-Nash predic-
tions). These predictions sharply contrast not only with our predictions, but
also with empirical evidences. Bergemann and Schlag (2005, 2007), Linhart
(2001) and Linhart and Radner (1989) make similar observations in other
settings such as monopoly pricing and bilateral bargaining. Ultimately, a
solution concept should be judged according to its merits in economic ap-
plications. We have written this paper with this perspective in mind and
hope that its user-friendly exposition will help applied theorists to apply our
solution concept fruitfully in future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy summarizes the ax-
iomatization of the minimax regret criterion and gives the deﬁnition of a
minimax regret equilibrium. Section 3 proposes several examples to illustrate
some interesting features of a minimax regret equilibrium, while Section 4
oﬀers some general properties. Section 4 discusses two possible extensions.
Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
2 Minimax Regret Equilibrium
2.1 Regret in Decision Theory
This section provides a brief review of “regret-type” decision rules. We re-
fer the reader to Savage (1951), Milnor (1954), Hayashi (2007), Puppe and
Schlag (2007) and Stoye (2007a,b) for in-depth treatments.
Consider a ﬁnite set Ω of states of the world and a ﬁnite set of outcomes
A. For any ﬁnite set X, we denote ∆(X) the set of all probabilities over X,




x∈X σ(x) = 1}. An act f is a mapping from
Ω to ∆(A), the set of lotteries over A, and we denote a menu of acts by F.
The primitive of the model is a preference relation  F over acts belonging
to the menu F.
5Minimax regret theory departs from subjective expected utility theory
(Anscombe and Aumann (1963)) in two important ways. First, it weakens the
axiom of independence to irrelevant alternatives to the axiom of independence
to never-optimal alternatives. In words, the axiom of independence to never-
optimal alternatives states that the act f is preferred to the act g in the
menu F if and only if the act f is preferred to the act g in the menu F′
obtained by complementing F with never-optimal acts.2 Second, it imposes
an axiom of ambiguity aversion as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), that is,
if an individual is indiﬀerent between acts f and g, then he (weakly) prefers
the mixing of f and g to either of them. An ambiguity averse individual
prefers to hedge bets across states.3 Weakening menu independence together
with ambiguity aversion leads to the following numerical representation of
 F: there exists a function U : A → R such that for all f ∈ F, g ∈ F,









u(h,ω) − u(g,ω)], (1)
with u(f,ω) the expected payoﬀ of the act f in state ω i.e., u(f,ω) =  
a∈A U(a)f(ω)(a). In Eq. (1), the term “maxh∈F u(h,ω) − u(f,ω)” is the
diﬀerence between the highest payoﬀ an individual would have got had he
known the state was ω, and the payoﬀ obtained by choosing f. We can
therefore interpret this term as the regret an individual might experience by
choosing f. Consequently, the act f is chosen over the act g if it minimizes
the maximal regret, hence the term “minimax regret.” However, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that the axiomatization of minimax regret does not rely
on any regret-led behaviors; it is rather “as if” individuals wish to minimize
their maximal regret. It is also worth noting that no prior beliefs explicitly
appear in Eq. (1). Or, more precisely, an individual considers all prior beliefs
π ∈ ∆(Ω) possible. The theory of minimax regret is therefore a theory of
complete uncertainty. Another well-known theory of complete uncertainty is
2An act h added to menu F is never-optimal if for all states ω ∈ Ω, there is some act
f′ ∈ F such that f′ (ω) is preferred to h(ω) where f′ (ω) and h(ω) are here identiﬁed with
constant acts. (Stoye (2007a), p. 4.)
3The axiom of symmetry is also imposed. Loosely speaking, it states that “a preference
ordering should not impose prior beliefs by implicitly assigning diﬀerent likelihoods to
diﬀerent events.” (Stoye (2007, p. 11).)
6maximin. Brieﬂy, maximin diﬀers from minimax regret in that it postulates
the axiom of independence to irrelevant alternatives, but relaxes the axiom of
independence. The axiom of independence states that the act f is preferred
to the act g in the menu F if and only if any mixture of the acts f and h is
preferred to the same mixture of the acts g and h in the menu composed of
all the mixtures of acts in F and {h}.
To illustrate the above concepts, let us consider the example below with
three states {ω1,ω2,ω3} and n > 4.
ω1 ω2 ω3
f 0 n (n − 1)/2
g 1/n 1 n/2
For n large, both acts f and g are very similar in states ω1 and ω3 and,
therefore, one might expect that f is preferred over g (since in state ω2, f
gives a disproportionaly larger payoﬀ than g). Indeed, f is preferred over g
according to the minimax regret theory. In contrast, g is preferred over f
according to the maximin theory. The problem with maximin is the entire
focus on the worst states of the world to compare acts, rather than to the
states in which the choice of an act is the most consequential as with minimax
regret. With minimax regret, the choice between two acts might depend on
the menus considered, however. To see this, consider the act h = (−n,−n,n).
We have that f is preferred over g in the menu {f,g}, but g is preferred
over f in the menu {f,g,h}. We do not ﬁnd this violation of the axiom of
independence to irrelevant alternatives disturbing. Experimental evidences
indeed suggest that the choice between two acts does depend on the presence
or absence of other options (see e.g., Simonson and Tversky (1992)).4
To capture the existence of partial prior information, consider a variant of
minimax regret theory introduced by Hayashi (2007) (see also Stoye (2007b))
that allows for a restricted set of prior assessments. Relaxing the symmetry
axiom, which captures the lack of prior information in the axiomatization of
4See Stoye (2007a) for more on this issue.
7minimax regret given by (1), it follows that there exists a closed and convex















Note that when Π = ∆(Ω), the minimax regret theory with multiple priors
reduces to the standard minimax theory ` a la Savage and when Π = {π∗},
it reduces to standard subjective expected utility. In the next section, min-
imax regret with multiple priors is the cornerstone of our solution concept:
minimax regret equilibrium.
2.2 Strategic-Form Games
Let g :=  N,(Ai,ui)i∈N  be a strategic-form game with N := {1,...,n}
the set of players, Ai the ﬁnite set of actions available to player i, and ui :
A := ×iAi → R the payoﬀ function of player i. With a slight abuse of
notation, we denote by G :=  N,(Σi,ui)i∈N  the mixed extension of g, that
is, Σi = ∆(Ai) is the set of mixed actions of player i and ui : Σ := ×iΣi → R
is the expected payoﬀ function.5 Denote Σ−i := ×j∈N\{i}Σj and σ−i a generic
element of Σ−i. Similarly, a−i is a generic element of A−i. A conjecture πi
for player i is a probability distribution on A−i. We say that the action σ∗
i
dominates the action σi if ui(σ∗
i ,σ−i) ≥ ui(σi,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i, and
ui(σ∗
i ,σ−i) > ui(σi,σ−i) for some σ−i ∈ Σ−i. An action is dominant if it
dominates all other actions. Similarly, we say that the action σ∗
i strictly
dominates the action σi if ui(σ∗
i ,σ−i) > ui(σi,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i. And an
action is strictly dominant if it strictly dominates all other actions. A Nash
equilibrium of the game G is a proﬁle of (mixed) actions σ∗ such that for all
a∗




−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N.
In words, σ∗
i is the common belief (conjecture) of player i’s opponents about
the pure actions player i will play. And rational players best-reply to their
conjectures. This paper proposes a new solution concept for games, which
presupposes neither mutual knowledge of rationality nor common knowledge
of conjectures. We call this solution concept a minimax regret equilibrium.
5Precisely, ui(σ1,...,σn) =
 
a1∈A1    
 
an∈An σ1(a1)...σn(an)ui(a1,...,an).




ui(ˆ ai,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i), (3)
that is, this is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ player i obtains when the
proﬁle of actions (ai,a−i) is played and the highest payoﬀ he might have
obtained had he known that his opponents were playing a−i. The regret












ui(ˆ ai,a−i) − ui(σi,σ−i).
Before deﬁning the concept of a minimax regret equilibrium, let us discuss
in more details the concept of regret. Regret as axiomatized in decision theory
(see above) is deﬁned with respect to a set of states of the world. Extending
this framework to choices in strategic situations, we identify the proﬁle of
actions a−i chosen by the other players with such a state. The alternative
of identifying the opponents’ proﬁle of mixed actions with this state of the
world is problematic. Indeed, it is fundamental for the motivation of the
axioms that the states are not related: changing an outcome in one state
should not have an impact on the outcomes in other states. If states were
identiﬁed with mixed actions, this would not be the case.
For each player i, let Πi ⊆ ∆(A−i) be some compact and convex set
of player i’s beliefs about the play of his opponents. It is important to note
that although conjectures are about opponents’ mixed actions and, therefore,
incorporate the fact that players play independently, player i’s belief πi ∈ Πi
about opponents’ pure actions might be correlated. To see this, suppose that
players 2 and 3 have two actions each, a and b, and player 1 conjectures that
they play the mixed action σ2(a) = σ3(a) = 1 with probability 1/4 and the
mixed action σ2(a) = σ2(a) = 1/3 with probability 3/4. Although player 1’s
conjecture puts strictly positive probability to independent mixing only, his
belief π1 over the play of his opponents is given by π1(a,a) = π1(b,b) = 1/3
9and π1(a,b) = π1(b,a) = 1/6, a correlated distribution.6 A special case is
where player i cannot rule out any mixed action proﬁles i.e., Πi = ∆(A−i).
In this case, we speak of complete uncertainty.
A convenient parametrization of the belief sets is the so-called ε-contamination
neighborhood around some given proﬁle σ∗
−i, with ε ∈ [0,1]. In this case, with
probability 1−ε, a player believes that his opponents will play σ∗
−i ∈ Σ−i and,
with probability ε, is completely uncertain about the play of his opponents.








−i + εσ−i,σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i)
 
.
An alternative is to consider the Cartesian product of independent ε-contamination















Both approaches have their merits and might give very diﬀerent predictions
in economic applications, as we will see later. To maintain focus and simplic-
ity, we assume that ε is the same for each player; this can be easily relaxed.
We are now ready to deﬁne the concept of a minimax regret equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A proﬁle of strategies σ∗ = (σ∗
i,σ∗
−i) is a minimax regret equi-
librium relative to (Π1,..,ΠN) if for each player i ∈ N, σ∗








for all σi ∈ Σi.
Several remarks are worth doing. First, a Nash equilibrium (σ∗
1,...,σ∗
n)
is a minimax regret equilibrium relative to {σ∗
−1},...,{σ∗
−n}. Second, for
given belief sets (Πi)i∈N, a minimax regret equilibrium might not exist. For





There is clearly no minimax regret equilibrium relative to ({δa},{δa}),
where δa is the Dirac mass on a. However, we can prove the existence of
6See Fudenberg and Levine (1993) for more on this.
7This two formulations of ε-contamination correspond to two versions of the concept
of independence in multiple prior models.
10a minimax regret equilibrium σ∗ = (σ∗
i ,σ∗
−i) relative to the ε-contamination
neighborhoods (Πiε(σ∗
−i))i∈N, whether neighborhoods are product of indepen-
dent neighborhoods or not. We call a minimax regret equilibrium relative
to ε-contamination neighborhoods an ε-minimax regret equilibrium.8 Third,
an alternative deﬁnition would include the belief sets (Πi)i∈N as part of the
equilibrium. Since we do not assume explicit randomization, we do not ﬁnd
this alternative deﬁnition compelling, however. Indeed, it would amount to
deﬁne two separate sets of beliefs for each player, which might be inconsis-
tent with equilibrium reasoning. To see this, suppose there are only two
players and let (σ∗
i,Π∗
i)i be a minimax regret equilibrium (with the alterna-
tive deﬁnition). Then for player i, not only σ∗
j represents his belief about
player j’s play, but also Π∗
i. And these two sets might not coincide. How can
player i endogenously entertain two diﬀerent sets of beliefs? In other words,
if equilibrium reasoning leads player i to the belief σ∗
j, why does the same
equilibrium reasoning lead him to the beliefs Π∗
i, which might be diﬀerent
from σ∗
j? Lastly, Theorem 1 gives a saddle-point interpretation of a minimax
regret equilibrium, which will prove extremely useful in applications.
Theorem 1 (Saddle point) The proﬁle (σ∗
i,σ∗
−i) is a minimax regret equi-








σi ∈ Σi for all i ∈ N.
Proof (⇐). For any i ∈ N, let (σ∗
i ,π∗
i) ∈ Σi × Πi be a saddle-point of Ri
























8The existence of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium (σ∗
i ,σ∗
−i) follows from the fact that
σ∗
−i ∈ Πi(σ∗
−i) and standard ﬁxed-point arguments. Furthermore, note that in an ε-
minimax regret equilibrium, the support of σ∗




i, a requirement imposed by Marinacci (2000).
11for all σi ∈ Σi. Henceforth, (σ∗




−i) be a minimax regret equilibrium relative to (Πi)i. In
particular, this implies that σ∗
−i ∈ Πi and there exists a π∗










Since the belief sets (Π)i∈N are compact and convex and the regret functions








































for all σi ∈ Σi and πi ∈ Πi. Henceforth, (σ∗
i,π∗
i) is a saddle point, which
completes the proof. ￿
It follows from Theorem 1 that ﬁnding a minimax regret equilibrium σ∗
relative to belief sets (Πi)i is equivalent to checking whether (σ∗
i,π∗
i) is a
Nash equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game between player i and a ﬁcti-
tious player, i’s“Nature,” in which player i’s action set is Σi, Nature’s action
set is Πi, and the payoﬀ function to Nature is Ri. In the next section, we
repeatedly use this important observation to analyze various examples. Be-
fore presenting the examples, three further remarks are worth making. First,
the requirement in Theorem 1 that Ri(σ∗
i,π∗
i) ≤ Ri(σi,π∗
i) for all σi ∈ Σi
is equivalent to σ∗





i) for all σi ∈ Σi. This is a rationality requirement.
Thus, it is as if the player is selecting a belief about the play of his op-
ponents according to the minimax regret criterion, and best replies to it.
Furthermore, for ε small enough, conjectures are almost common knowledge
and, consequently, ε-minimax regret equilibria are approximate Nash equi-
libria. Indeed, in an ε-minimax regret equilibrium σ∗, each player i assigns
probability at least 1 − ε to the mixed action σ∗
−i being played.9 Second,
9The solution concept shares similar epistemic foundations as the concept of ε-
ambiguous equilibrium of Mukerji (1995).
12our framework is easily generalized to games with inﬁnite strategy spaces.
For instance, if Ai is a compact Hausdorﬀ space, ∆(Ai) the set of (regular,
countably additive) probability measures on the Borel subsets of Ai, then a
suﬃcient condition for Theorem 1 to hold is that the zero-sum game between
each player i and i’s Nature is payoﬀ secure (see Reny (1999)).10 The game
of price competition studied in Section 3 is payoﬀ secure.
3 Applications
3.1 How to ﬁnd ε-minimax regret equilibria?
This ﬁrst example carefully spells out all steps necessary to ﬁnd the ε-
minimax regret equilibria of a game. Following examples will be treated





The game G1 has two pure Nash equilibria (a,b) and (b,a) and one mixed
equilibrium ((3/5,2/5)(3/5,2/5)). Let us ﬁrst consider large uncertainty, so
that ε = 1. To ﬁnd the ε-minimax regret equilibria with ε = 1, we ﬁrst




10More precisely, Reny requires that the mixed extension of the zero-sum game between
player i and i’s Nature to be better-reply secure. Since the game is zero-sum, its mixed
extension is reciprocally upper semi-continuous. Therefore, payoﬀ security insures that
the mixed extension is better-reply secure.
13For instance, if both players play a, player 1 experiences an ex-post regret
of 2 as the best action would have been b, had he known that player 2 was
playing a. Second, we use Theorem 1 to search for an equilibrium of the




This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which player 1 chooses the
mixed action (3/5,2/5). It guarantees a maximal regret of 6/5. Similarly, for
player 2. Therefore, the totally mixed Nash equilibrium ((3/5,2/5),(3/5,2/5))
is the unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium with ε = 1. We now show that
it is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε.
Let (σ1(a),σ1(b)),(σ2(a),σ2(b))) be a mixed action proﬁle. In the zero-
sum game between player 1 and 1’s “Nature,” the payoﬀ to player 1 if he
plays a1 ∈ {a,b} and Nature plays a2 ∈ {a,b} is
−(1 − ε)(σ2(a)r1(a1,a) + σ2(b)r1(a1,b)) − εr1(a1,a2).
Since ((3/5,2/5),(3/5,2/5)) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium with ε =
1, we have that (3/5)r1(a,a) + (2/5)r1(a,b) = (3/5)r1(b,a) + (2/5)r1(b,b).
Thus, when player 1 conjectures that player 2 is playing the mixed action
(σ2(a),σ2(b)) = (3/5,2/5) with probability at least 1 − ε, player 1’s payoﬀ
in the zero-sum game is −(1 − ε)(6/5) − εr1(a1,a2). The zero-sum game
between player 1 and 1’s “Nature” is therefore given by:
a b
a −(1 − ε)6
5 − ε2,(1 − ε)6
5 + ε2 −(1 − ε)6
5,(1 − ε)6
5




5 −(1 − ε)
6
5 − ε3,(1 − ε)
6
5 + ε3
Clearly, ((3/5,2/5)(3/5,2/5)) is an equilibrium of this game and, conse-
quently, is an ε-minimax regret for all ε. The (symmetric) mixed Nash
equilibrium survives any uncertainty from small to large. We can apply
14the exact same arguments to show that ((3/5,2/5)(3/5,2/5)) is the only
non-degenerate ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε > 0.
Lastly, we can similarly check that (a,b) and (b,a) are ε-minimax regret
equilibria for ε ≤ 2/5. Note that (a,a) is not a minimax regret equilibrium
for any ε. It is, however, an ε-maximin equilibrium if ε is large enough.
Besides spelling out the working of ε-minimax regret equilibria, this ﬁrst
example gives the impression that only rationalizable action proﬁles are in
the support of ε-minimax regret equilibria. The next example shows that
this impression is false.
3.2 Fairness and social eﬃciency





The game G2 is dominance-solvable and has a unique rationalizable pro-
ﬁle (b,b). The set of ε-minimax regret equilibria is {((2/3,1/3)(0,1))} for
ε > 1/3, {((2/3,1/3)(0,1)),((0,1)(0,1))} for ε = 1/3 and {((0,1)(0,1))}
for ε < 1/3. In any ε-minimax regret equilibrium, player 1 believes that
player 2 might play b with a probability ranging from 1−ε to 1, and a with
the complementary probability. Indeed, b is strictly dominant for player 2,
and player 1 believes that player 2 is rational with probability 1 − ε in an
ε-minimax regret equilibrium. Furthermore, player 1 is indiﬀerent between
playing a or b if he believes that player 2 is playing a with probability 1/3.
Therefore, for ε ≥ 1/3, player 1 can rationally play either a or b as both
actions are best-replies to the admissible belief (1/3,2/3). For ε < 1/3, the
probability assigned to b is at least 2/3 and, consequently, player 1 cannot
rationally play a: there are no admissible beliefs that make a a best-reply.
This example highlights two interesting features of minimax regret equi-
librium. First, an ε-minimax regret equilibrium might not be rationalizable.
This is not surprising as rationalizability relies on common knowledge in
15rationality, while minimax regret equilibrium does not even assume mutual
knowledge in rationality. It is worth noting that the concept of conjectural
equilibrium also shares this feature (Battigalli (1987)).11 However, for ε
small enough, any ε-minimax regret equilibrium survives iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies. Second, for ε ≥ 1/3, the proﬁle (a,b) is in
the support of ε-minimax regret equilibrium and, therefore, can be observed
by an outside observer, say an experimenter. And not only is (a,b) socially
eﬃcient (Charness and Rabin (2002)), but it also minimizes inequality (Fehr
and Schmidt (1999)).
3.3 Dominated strategies
This next example shows that a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated
strategies can be an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε. Consider the
game G3 below.
a b c
a 0,0 6,6 0,6
b 6,6 0,0 0,0
c 6,0 0,0 1,1
G3
The proﬁle of strategies ((1/2,1/2,0),(1/2,1/2,0)) is a Nash equilibrium in
weakly dominated strategies.12 Let us show that it is an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for any ε. To do so, we construct the table representing the
zero-sum game between player 1 and 1’s “Nature” (the table is similar for
player 2) as follows.
a b c
a (1 − ε)3 + ε6 (1 − ε)3 + ε0 (1 − ε)3 + ε1
b (1 − ε)3 + ε0 (1 − ε)3 + ε6 (1 − ε)3 + ε1
c (1 − ε)3 + ε0 (1 − ε)3 + ε6 (1 − ε)3 + ε0
11Both concepts do not coincide, however. For instance, (a,b) is a conjectural equilib-
rium.
12For instance, (1/2,1/2,0) is weakly dominated by (1/2,1/4,1/4).
16Note that the payoﬀ in each cell is the payoﬀ of 1’s Nature. It is then
easy to check that for any ε, ((1/2,1/2,0),(1/2,1/2,0)) is a Nash equilib-
rium of this zero-sum game. A similar argument for player 2 shows that
((1/2,1/2,0),(1/2,1/2,0)), albeit weakly dominated, is indeed an ε-minimax
regret equilibrium for any ε. Although it is not our primary aim, the concept
of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium might be the basis for a reﬁnement of
the concept of Nash equilibrium as ε → 0. We can already note, however,
that the Nash equilibria surviving our reﬁnement might be neither perfect
nor proper.13 Section 5 discusses this issue in more details.
3.4 A three-player example
In this example, we show that the representation of belief sets as either the
product of independent ε-contaminations or a (correlated) ε-contamination
has important consequences for the equilibrium characterization. Consider









Note that action a is strictly dominant for both players 2 and 3. The game
has a continuum of Nash equilibria, in which player 1 randomizes between
a and b with any probability and players 2 and 3 play a. For n-player
games (n ≥ 3), the representation of belief sets as ε-contaminations entails a
choice: either we model it as the product of independent ε-contaminations or
as a (correlated) ε-contamination. First, consider the former. Let us check
whether (a,a,a) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for some ε > 0. For
players 2 and 3, since a is a strictly dominant action, it is clearly part of an
ε-minimax regret equilibrium. Turning to player 1, we construct his regret
table:
13Weakly dominated Nash equilibria are neither perfect nor proper.
17a,a a,b b,a b,b
a 0 0 0 1
b 0 1 1 0 ,
and then consider the zero-sum game between player 1 and his “Nature”:
a,a a,b b,a b,b
a 0,0 0,0 0,0 −ε,ε
b 0,0 −ε,ε −ε,ε 0,0 .
Clearly, a is not part of any equilibrium of the above game. If player 1
considers playing a, 1’s Nature maximizes his regret by playing (b,b), in
which case a deviation to b is proﬁtable for player 1. Henceforth, (a,a,a) is
not an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε > 0. Similarly, for (b,a,a). In
fact, we can show that the only ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε > 0
is ((1/2,1/2),(1,0),(1,0)).
Second, suppose that belief sets are represented by the product of in-
dependent contaminations. Let us check whether (a,a,a) is an ε-minimax
regret equilibrium. The zero-sum game between player 1 and 1’s “Nature”
is now:
a,a a,b b,a b,b
a 0,0 0,0 0,0 −ε2,ε2
b 0,0 −ε,ε −ε,ε −2(ε − ε2),2(ε − ε2)
For instance, if 1’s “Nature” plays (b,b), player 1’s regret of playing a is
(1 − ε)
2r1(a,a,a) + (1 − ε)εr1(a,a,b) + ε(1 − ε)r1(a,b,a) + ε
2r1(a,b,b).
It follows that (a,a,a) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium (with independent
contaminations) if ε ≤ 2/3. The intuition is the following. If player 1
considers playing a, 1’s “Nature maximizes” his regret by playing (b,b), which
18occurs with probability ε2. If (b,b) is played, player 1’s regret is 1. However,
if player 1 considers deviating to b, his regret is 1 when the proﬁle of actions
(a,b) or (b,a) is played. And this occurs with probability 2ε(1 − ε). Since
player 1 is indiﬀerent between a and b when (a,a) is played by his opponents,
it follows that player 1 is better oﬀ playing a if ε2 ≤ 2ε(1−ε) i.e., if ε ≤ 2/3.
Both approaches might therefore lead to very diﬀerent predictions in games.
The following economic application reinforces this point.
3.5 Bertrand competition and price dispersion
Consider a market in which n ﬁrms compete in prices to sell a homogeneous
product. Each ﬁrm i posts a price pi and the ﬁrm posting the lowest price
wins the entire market. In the event of a tie, each ﬁrm charging the lowest
price has an equal chance of serving the entire market. The market demand
is unitary if the lowest price is smaller than 1, the monopoly price, and zero
otherwise (the choke price is 1). Each ﬁrm marginal cost of production is ci.






|argminj{(pj)j∈N}|, ifpi ≤ 1,
0, otherwise.
A ﬁrm faces two sources of regret. First, ﬁrm i’s price might turned out to
be lower than the lowest price of its competitors. Had ﬁrm i posted a higher
price, it would also have served the entire market and made a higher proﬁt.
Second, ﬁrm i’s price might turned to be higher than the lowest price of its
competitors, and the regret arises from not serving the market at all. The
exposure to these two sources of regret has important economic implications,
as we will see. Formally, the regret to ﬁrm i is:
ri(pi,p−i) = (min({(pj)j∈N} ∪ {1}) − ci) − ui (pi,p−i).
14For any set X, δX is the Dirac mass on X.
19Two ﬁrms and identical costs. For simplicity, we start by considering
the case of two ﬁrms and identical marginal costs, normalized to zero. Let us







constitutes an ε-minimax regret equilibrium. Let us conjecture that ﬁrm i’s
regret is maximized at the monopoly price i.e., p = 1. Accordingly, with
probability (1−ε), ﬁrm i’s competitor follows the pricing strategy G deﬁned
above while, with probability ε, ﬁrm i faces an “irrational” competitor, and
conjectures that it prices at the monopoly price. Firm i’s regret of posting
any price pi ∈ [ε,1) is:
(1 − ε)







+ ε(1 − pi) = −εlnε.
For almost any price pi ∈ [ε,1], ﬁrm i’s regret is therefore constant and equal
to −εlnε.15 Moreover, if ﬁrm i prices below ε, its regret is −εlnε + ε − pi,
a non-proﬁtable deviation. The intuition is simple: if ﬁrm i prices below
ε, it is sure to serve the entire market. However, its exposure to potential
regret is substantial: both the “rational” and “irrational” incarnations of its
competitor might price all the way up to the monopoly price. Similarly, if
ﬁrm i prices above 1, his regret is −εlnε + ε, a non-proﬁtable deviation.
Consequently, the mixed strategy G satisﬁes all the requirements to be a
mixed Nash equilibrium in the zero-sum game between ﬁrm i and i’s “Na-
ture.” Note that pricing according to G is indeed player i’s best-reply to the
conjecture that his opponent prices according to G with probability (1 − ε)
and at the monopoly price with probability ε.16
Let us now turn to our conjecture that ﬁrm i’s “Nature” maximizes i’s
regret at the monopoly price, that is, we have to check that Ri(G, ˆ p) is
15Due to the tie-breaking rule, there is a discontinuity at 1: i’s regret if it posts the
monopoly price is −εlnε + 0.5ε, which is higher than −εlnε.
16His expected payoﬀ of pricing in [ε,1) is pi[(1−ε)(1−G(pi))+ε] = ε. In fact, solving
for pi[(1 − ε)(1 − G(pi)) + ε] = k for some k ≥ 0 and for all pi ∈ (a,b) along with the
boundary conditions G(a) = 0 and G(b) = 1, and ui(pi,G) ≤ k for all pi / ∈ (a,b) gives us
the functional form of G.
20maximized at ˆ p = 1. Clearly, 1’s “Nature” will price neither strictly below ε
nor strictly above 1. Firm i’s regret if “Nature” prices at ˆ p ∈ [ε,1] is
Ri (G, ˆ p) = ˆ p −
  ˆ p
ε
pidG(pi),
which is strictly convex in ˆ p. So all we have to check is that Ri (G,ε) ≤
Ri (G,1), which is satisﬁed if











This inequality holds if ε < 0.39423. Therefore, for small values of ε, ﬁrms
post prices according to the randomized strategy G in an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the expected proﬁt to each ﬁrm is strictly positive and
each ﬁrm prices strictly above the marginal cost with probability one. The
average price is −(εlnε)/(1 − ε). For instance, when ε = 0.1, the average
price is 0.25584. While the distribution G converges to δ{p≥0} in distribution
as ε goes to zero, the marginal increase of the average price at ε = 0 is equal
to +∞. Only small uncertainty regarding the strategy of one’s competitor
causes a dramatic increase in prices. Our predictions are not only diﬀer
with the Bertrand-Nash predictions, but also with the “maxmin” predictions.
Indeed, the worst a ﬁrm can face is that its competitor prices at the marginal
cost, hence (0,0) is the unique ε-maximin equilibrium for any ε. Lastly, we
can equivalently show that the Nash equilibrium (0,0) is not an ε-minimax
regret equilibrium for any ε > 0.
Next, we prove that the ε-minimax regret equilibrium is almost surely
unique, i.e., that the pricing strategies are unique up to how prices are set
on a set of measure 0. To do this, we ﬁrst remind the reader of the following
property of equilibria of zero-sum games.
Lemma 1 Let σ∗ and ˆ σ be two minimax regret equilibria relative to (Πi)i∈N.
Assume there exists a saddle point, so that for all i ∈ N, πi ∈ Πi and σi ∈ Σi,


















i) = Ri(ˆ σi, ˆ πi) = Ri(σ
∗
i , ˆ πi).
In words if (σ∗
i,π∗
i) and (ˆ σi, ˆ πi) are two equilibria of the zero-sum game
between player i and i’s “Nature,” then the equilibrium payoﬀ is the same.
We now return to our proof. Assume ε < 0.39423. Let (G∗,G∗) be the
ε-minimax regret equilibrium characterized above and suppose that ˆ σ is an-
other ε-minimax regret equilibrium. Denote ˆ Gj(p) = Prˆ σj(pj ≤ p) the prob-
ability under ˆ σj that ﬁrm j prices below p. From the above arguments, we
know that player i’s “Nature” maximizes i’s regret when player i follows G∗
by pricing at 1 (see above). Therefore, the belief ˆ πi = (1 − ε) ˆ Gj + εδ{p≥1}
maximizes i’s regret among all beliefs that are ε-contaminations of ˆ G. From
Lemma 1, it follows that pi[(1 − ε)(1 − ˆ Gj(pi)) + ε] = ε for all pi ∈ [ε,1)






/(1 − ε) = G∗(pi) for all pi ∈ [ε,1). This
proves uniqueness.
Two ﬁrms and diﬀerent marginal costs. We now assume that the
two ﬁrms have diﬀerent marginal costs c1 and c2 with 0 ≤ c1 < c2 < 1. Firm
1 is the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. For small ε, we can expect the eﬃcient ﬁrm to
undercut the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, thus focusing on the event that its conjecture
is correct (with probability 1 − ε). Consequently, let us conjecture that ﬁrm
1 prices according to the distribution G1 on [a,b], ﬁrm 2 prices according
to G2 on [a,1], and G2 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates G1. What might
maximize the regret of a ﬁrm? Since we expect ﬁrm 1 to try to undercut
ﬁrm 2, we can conjecture than ﬁrm 1’s regret is maximized at the monopoly
price (the highest price consistent with a positive demand). Thus, ﬁrm 1
will face the distribution F2 = δ{p2:p2≥1} with probability ε. Regarding ﬁrm
2, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, we expect it to be mostly concerned with foregone
proﬁts when, with probability ε, its conjecture about ﬁrm 1 is incorrect.
Since foregone proﬁts are higher, the higher ﬁrm 1’s price, we expect ﬁrm
2’s regret to be maximized when it faces the distribution F1 with support
[b,1]. Let us show that we can indeed construct such an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium.
First, we consider the indiﬀerence conditions. To be indiﬀerent between
almost all prices in the support of Gi, the following equality for ﬁrm i has to
22be satisﬁed
(p − ci)(1 − (1 − ε)G−i (p) − εF−i (p)) = a − ci, (8)










for all p ∈ [a,b]. Let us focus on ﬁrm 1. Since we conjecture an equilibrium









and, consequently, the parameters a and b have to satisfy:
a = c2 + ε(b − c2).
Furthermore, since G1 (p) = 1 for all p ≥ b, ﬁrm 2’s indiﬀerence condition
(8) implies




for (almost) all p ∈ [b,1]. Let us now turn to ﬁrm 2.
For any p ∈ [b,1], the support of F1, the indiﬀerence condition for 2’s
“Nature” (i.e., the “irrational” incarnation of ﬁrm 1) implies that the regret
of ﬁrm 2 when facing price p, denoted by R2 (G2,p), is constant, that is,
R2 (G2,p) = (p − c2) −
  p
a
(x − c2)g2 (x)dx














17Since R2 is the payoﬀ function of 2’s “Nature” in the zero-sum game between ﬁrm 2
and 2’s “Nature”.
23for all p ∈ [b,1]. In particular, we need that G2 (1) = 1 which implies that
a = c1 +
 







Together with the above expression for a, we obtain




Note that the parameter b does not depend on ε. Clearly, the above equation
has a solution with b ≥ c2. Furthermore, as ε goes to zero, the parameter a
goes to c2, ﬁrm 1 prices at c2 and ﬁrm 2 prices according to the distribution
¯ G2(p) = 1 −
c2−c1
p−c1 for p ∈ [c2,b]. By construction, ﬁrm 1 facing ¯ G2 is indif-
ferent over all prices in [c2,b] and, therefore, these limit strategies constitute
a mixed Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game.
Second, we have to verify that no player has an incentive to deviate.
Nature replacing ﬁrm 2 must be maximizing ﬁrm 1’s regret at the monopoly
price p = 1 (since we assume F2 = δ{p2:p2≥1}). As in the case with homegenous
cost, the regret is strictly convex in p, and a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for R1(G1,a) ≤ R1(G1,1) is given by:







2dp ≥ a − c1. (10)
Finally, it is easy to check that ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to price either above
b or below a. Similarly, for ﬁrm 2 and 2’s “Nature”. Thus, if Eq. (10) holds,
(G1,G2) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium.
To illustrate our ﬁndings, let us consider a numerical example. Assume
that c1 = 0, c2 = 0.5 and ε = 0.1. We have that a = 0.52, b = 0.76, and
the pricing policies are illustrated in the ﬁgure below. Observe that ﬁrm 2’s











most efficient firm     
less efficient firm     
Several ﬁrms and identical costs. We now consider the case of
n ≥ 3 ﬁrms in order to illustrate, within an economic example, the diﬀer-
ences between the two formulations of belief sets: correlated contaminations
or product of independent contaminations. Costs are identical and normal-
ized to zero. We ﬁrst investigate the situation where the belief sets are
product of independent contaminations. Each ﬁrm believes that each oppo-
nent independently chooses according to the distribution G with probability
1 − ε and is uncertain about the opponents’ play, otherwise. Let us look
for an ε-minimax regret equilibrium in which all ﬁrms price according to the
distribution G on [εn−1,1] and each respective adversarial Nature maximizes
regret at the monopoly price.
Let Gε = (1 − ε)G + εδ{p≥1}. For all p ∈ [εn−1,1), the proﬁt to ﬁrm i is
p(1 − Gε (p))
n−1 and together with the fact that it goes to εn−1 as p goes to








Denote g the density of G. Now, we show that each adversarial Nature
indeed maximizes regret at the monopoly price. For this, we derive ﬁrm i’s
regret by considering it as a sum of independent events. Consider the event
in which n−m ﬁrms out of n−1 choose according to G while an adversarial
Nature charges the prices of the remaining m − 1 ﬁrms. This event occurs
with probability (1 − ε)
n−m εm−1  n−1
n−m
 
. Let q be the lowest price charged by
Nature. Conditional on this event, ﬁrm i’s regret is
  q
0
pg(p)(n − m)(1 − G(p))






Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to q, we obtain after simpliﬁca-
tions:
(1 − G(q))
n−m (1 − qg(q)).
Lastly, note that
1 − qg (q) = 1 −
ε




and is increasing in q. Moreover, at q = εn−1, the above expression is equal
to 1 − 1
(1−ε)(n−1), which is strictly positive if ε < 1 − 1
n−1. Therefore, for
ε < 1 − 1/(n − 1), the derivative of the regret with respect to q is strictly
positive (except at the point p = 1), hence the regret is maximized at the
monopoly price.
18Let ˜ Gε be the distribution of the order statistics min(p−i). The regret to ﬁrm i of
posting the price pi is
  pi
εn−1
min(p−i)d ˜ Gε(min(p−i)) +
  1
pi
(min(p−i) − pi)d ˜ Gε(min(p−i)),
and together with the boundary conditions give the distribution G.
26The expected price is equal to ε(1−εn−2)/[(1−ε)(n−2)] and is increasing
in the degree of conﬁdences about opponents’ conjectures, ε, as in the case
with two ﬁrms. However, unlike the two-ﬁrm case, the marginal increase in
the expected price at ε = 0 is now ﬁnite (equal to 1/(n − 2)). Furthermore,
the expected price is decreasing in n i.e., the more intense the competition,
the lower the expected price. As n → +∞, the ε-minimax regret equilibrium
converges to the competitive equilibrium.
Let us now turn to the situation where a ﬁrm expects with probabil-
ity 1 − ε that all other ﬁrms independently price according to G, and is
completely uncertain otherwise, that is, we consider the case of “correlated”
contaminations. In that situation, adversarial Natures have a larger impact
on the pricing policy of ﬁrms. Following the same logic as before, we have


















b for p ∈ [b,1],







Such a b exists for ε < 1/e where b ∈ (1/e,1). For completeness, let us give
the strategy (distribution) F followed by each adversarial Nature:














for p ∈ [b,1]. As in the preceding cases, the reader can check that this is
indeed an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for ε small enough i.e., ε < (n −
2)/(n − 1).
A simple numerical example helps to illustrate the diﬀerences between
both formulations. With 5 ﬁrms and ε = 0.1, the pricing policies in the case
of independent and correlated contaminations are represented in the graph












Correlation             
Independence            
Both policies are strikingly diﬀerent. With independent contaminations,
a ﬁrm is mainly concerned with facing “rational” competitors who price close
to the marginal cost; the likelihood to face only “irrational” ﬁrms is extremely
small (10−5). Consequently, ﬁrms price very close to the marginal cost (see
the curve in dots). In contrast, with correlated contaminations, the likeli-
hood to face only “irrational” ﬁrms is disproportionately higher 10−1 and,
therefore, ﬁrms are more concerned with the possibility of foregoing oppor-
tunities. Their pricing policy reﬂects this concern and accordingly prices are
more likely to be substantially above marginal costs.
To summarize, our results are that ﬁrms make positive expected proﬁt,
price above marginal costs and there is price dispersion in all cases. Moreover,
with several ﬁrms and correlated contaminations, the pricing policy exhibits
a kink at b, which is close to the monopoly price for ε small enough. All
these ﬁndings agree remarkably well with experimental and ﬁeld data (see
Baye and Morgan (2004).)
Finally, let us note that although our results are stated for price compe-
tition, they readily translate to models of ﬁrst-price auction (with complete
information). To do so, if vi ∈ [0,1] is the valuation for the object of bidder
28i, then we can set ci = 1−vi and use the equivalence relation b ∼ 1−p where
b is the bid of a player to obtain the equilibrium bidding policy ˆ Gi. Formally,
ˆ Gi(b) = 1−Gi(1−p) if Gi is the pricing policy in an ε-minimax regret equi-
librium of the Bertrand game. For instance, if both bidders have the same
valuation 1, their bidding strategy follows the distribution εb/((1−ε)(1−b))
with support [0,1 − ε].
4 Some properties of ε-minimax regret equi-
libria
This section presents some properties of ε-minimax regret equilibria of ﬁnite
games. Recall from example G3 that a minimax regret equilibrium can be
in weakly dominated strategies. Our ﬁrst result shows that this cannot the
case when players have a dominant action.
Proposition 1 Let σ∗ be a minimax regret equilibria relative to (Πi)i∈N. (i)
If σ∗∗
i is a dominant strategy for player i, then σ∗
i = σ∗∗
i . (ii) If ai is a strictly
dominated action, then σ∗
i (ai) = 0.
Proof Part (i). Let σ∗ be a minimax regret equilibria relative to (Πi)i∈N
and σ∗∗
i a dominant strategy for player i. Since σ∗∗
i is dominant, we have
that ui(σ∗∗
i ,σ−i) ≥ ui(σi,σ−i) for all σi ∈ Σi, for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i, and for
all σi ∈ Σi, there exists a σ′




Therefore, 0 = Ri(σ∗∗
i ,σ−i) ≤ Ri(σi,σ−i) for all σi ∈ Σi, for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
This implies that 0 = Ri(σ∗∗
i ,πi) ≤ Ri(σi,πi) for all σi ∈ Σi, for all πi ∈ Πi.
Since σ∗ is a minimax regret equilibrium and Ri( , ) ≥ 0, it follows that
Ri(σ∗
i ,πi) = 0 for all πi ∈ Πi. Consequently, σ∗
i = σ∗∗
i . For otherwise, there
exists a σ′




−i), a contradiction with σ∗
being a minimax regret equilibrium.
Part (ii). By contradiction. Suppose that there exists a strictly dominated
action ai such that σ∗
i (ai) > 0 for some player i. This implies that σ∗
i is not
a best-reply to any conjecture πi ∈ Πi ⊆ ∆(A−i) of player i. However, from
Theorem 1, σ∗
i is a best-reply to the conjecture π∗
i , a contradiction. ￿
29Proposition 1 implies that Nash equilibria in dominant actions are robust
to the introduction of uncertainty about the rationality and conjectures of
opponents. This result is not surprising since players are assumed to be
rational in our model. Part (ii) also shows that players do not play strictly
dominated strategies in an ε-minimax regret equilibrium. In fact, for ε small
enough, any pure action in the support of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium
survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated actions.
Proposition 2 There exists an ε∗ such that for any ε < ε∗, if σ∗ is an ε-
minimax regret equilibrium and ai does not survive iterated deletion of strictly
dominated actions, then σ∗
i (ai) = 0.
Proof We present the proof for the case of correlated ε-contaminations.
The case of independent ε-contaminations is similar. Let (εm)m∈N be any
sequence converging to 0 and, for each m ∈ N, let σm be an εm-minimax
regret equilibrium of G. Set A0
i := Ai and deﬁne recursively:
A
k
i := {ai ∈ A
k−1
i : there is no a′
i ∈ A
k−1
i such that ui(a′




i is the set of player i’s pure strategies that survives k rounds of
iterated deletion of strictly dominated pure strategies. We want to show that




First, we show that the support of σm
i is in A1
i for each player i ∈ N, for
each m ∈ N. By contradiction, suppose that a∗
i is in the support of σm
i , but
a∗
i / ∈ A1
i for some player i, for some m. This implies that there exists an action
¯ ai such that ri(¯ ai,a−i) < ri(a∗
i,a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i. Consider the mixed
strategy ¯ σi with ¯ σi(a∗
i) = 0, ¯ σi(¯ ai) = σm
i (a∗
i) + σm
i (¯ ai), and ¯ σi(ai) = σm
i (ai)
for all ai  = a∗
i,¯ ai. It follows that Ri(¯ σi,a−i) < Ri(σm
i ,a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i
since
Ri(¯ σi,a−i) − Ri(σ
m








i cannot be an εm minimax regret equilibrium, a contradic-
tion. Hence, the support of σm
i is included in A1
i for each player i ∈ N, for
any m ∈ N.
30Second, we show that there exists an M∗ such that the support of σm
i
is included A2
i for each player i ∈ N, for all m > M∗. By contradiction,
suppose that for any M, there exists an action am
i in the support of σm
i with
am
i / ∈ A2
i for some player i, for some m > M (hence, A2
i ⊂ A1
i). Without
loss of generality, assume it is for all m > M. This implies that there exists
an action ¯ am
i such that ri(¯ am
i ,a−i) < ri(am
i ,a−i) for all a−i ∈ A1
−i, for all
m > M. For each m > M, construct the mixed strategy ¯ σm
i as ¯ σi above.
Since σm is an εm-minimax regret equilibrium and the expected regret is





























i ,a−i)] ≥ 0.
By the preceding arguments, the ﬁrst term is strictly negative since the
support of σm
−i is in A1


















Note that K is well-deﬁned by ﬁniteness of the action spaces. Furthermore,

















Consequently, there exists a M(2) such that σm cannot simultaneously be
an εm-minimax regret equilibrium for m > M(2) and the support of σm
i not
included in A2
i for some player i. By induction, we can ﬁnd such a M(k) for
any k > 2.
Lastly, since we consider ﬁnite strategic-form games, there exists a K
such that the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies stops after K
rounds, and set M∗ equal to the minimum of the M(k) for k = 1,...,K. ￿
Proposition 2 thus states that for ε small enough, the pure actions in
the support of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium survive iterated deletion of
strictly dominated pure actions. However, we hasten to stress that an ε-
minimax regret equilibrium might not survive iterated deletion of strictly
31dominated (mixed and pure) strategies even for small ε > 0, as the following
example illustrates.
a b c
a −1,1 1,−1 4,−2
b 1,−1 −1,1 0,−2
Observe that the pure action c is strictly dominated for player 2. Deleting
c, the game is a game of matching pennies with ((1/2,1/2)(1/2,1/2)) as the
unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε (with a regret of 1 to each
player). However, it is not an ε-minimax regret equilibrium of the game with
action c. The reason is simple. If player 1 uniformly randomizes between a
and b, 1’s “Nature” maximizes player 1’s regret by playing c, which gives a
maximal regret of 1 + 3ε > 1. However, if player 1 faces the mixed strategy
(1 − ε)(1/2,1/2,0) + ε(0,0,1), a is the unique best-reply. The unique ε-
minimax regret equilibrium is ((2/3,1/3)(1/2,1/2,0)) for any ε > 0.
The next proposition states that ε-minimax regret equilibria are ε′-Nash
equilibria for ε′ appropriately chosen. Intuitively, Theorem 1 implies that
each player is best replying to a mixture between the mixed strategy of his
opponents (with probability 1 − ε) and a mixed strategy of his “Nature”
(with probability ε), and thus a player’s payoﬀ cannot diﬀer too much from
his optimal payoﬀ had he known the strategy of his opponents.
Proposition 3 Let σ∗ be an ε-minimax regret equilibrium with ε < 1. There
exists a γ > 0 such that σ∗ is an ε′-Nash equilibrium with ε′ ≥ γε/(1 − ε).
Proof Suppose that σ∗ is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium (with correlated
ε-contamination). If ε = 0, then σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, hence an ε′-Nash

















































i, ˆ σ−i) − max
ˆ σ−i∈∆(A−i)
Ri(ˆ σi, ˆ σ−i)
 
≤ 0,
since σ∗ is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium, S(σ∗
i ) is compact, and Ri is bi-
continuous. Let ε′ := εmaxi∈N |γi(σ∗)|/(1−ε). Then, we have for all i ∈ N,









which is the desired result. Note that ε′ depends on σ∗. To get a uniform
bound, consider








Ri(ˆ σi, ˆ σ−i),
and let ε′ := εmaxi∈N |¯ γi|/(1 − ε).
With the product of independent ε-contaminations, the proof is similar
and left to the reader. ￿
In an ε-minimax regret equilibrium, the parameter ε relates to the uncer-
tainty about rationality and conjectures and, consequently, to the (expected)
ex-post regret. In contrast, the parameter ε′ relates to the ex-ante regret in
an ε′-Nash equilibrium. Proposition 3 links these two parameters: we may
therefore think of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium as an ε′-Nash equilibrium,
in which players might not maximize their payoﬀ even though they have cor-
rect conjectures about their opponents’ strategies. Furthermore, ε′ goes to
0 as ε goes to zero, and ε′ is monotone increasing in ε. As a consequence,
the set of ε-minimax regret equilibria converges to the set of Nash equilibria
as ε goes to zero. The converse of Proposition 3 does not hold, however.
For instance, in example G4, not all Nash equilibria, albeit ε′-equilibrium
with ε′ = 0, are ε-minimax regret equilibria, even with inﬁnitesimally small
uncertainty. However, any strict Nash equilibrium is an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for ε small enough.
Proposition 4 Let σ∗ be a strict Nash equilibrium. There exists a ε∗ > 0
such that σ∗ is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε < ε∗.
33The proof of Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition 3 and left
to the reader. Note that not all ε-minimax regret equilibria are strict Nash
equilibria, even with inﬁnitesimally small uncertainty. For instance, in the
game below, (a,a) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε ∈ [0,1], but
is not strict. And the strict Nash equilibrium (c,c) is an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for ε ≤ 1/3.
a b c
a 1,1 1,1 0,0
b 1,1 0,0 0,0
c 0,0 0,0 0.5,0.5
5 Extensions
We now discuss two possible extensions. The ﬁrst extension regards games
with incomplete information.
Incomplete information. Let  N,(Ai,Θi,ui,Πi)i∈N  be a Bayesian
game with multiple priors where N := {1,...,n} is the set of players, Ai the
set of pure actions of player i, Θi the ﬁnite set of possible types of player
i, ui : X × Θ → R the payoﬀ function of player i with A := ×iAi and
Θ := ×iΘi, and Πi is the (compact and convex) set of possible priors over Θ
of player i.
A pure strategy for player i is a mapping si : Θi → Ai. Given a proﬁle






In words, if players follow the strategy s and the type proﬁle turns out
to be θ, the ex-post regret of player i measures his foregone payoﬀ. The
next deﬁnition extends our previous deﬁnition to games with incomplete
information. For simplicity, we state the deﬁnition for pure strategies.
34Deﬁnition 2 A proﬁle of pure strategies s∗ = (s∗
i,s∗
−i) is a minimax regret

















for all ai ∈ Ai.
In the above formulation, the assumption that payoﬀ-relevant types are
private information drives the strategic uncertainty. Nonetheless, it is not
diﬃcult to amend our formulation to account for incomplete information
about rationality as well. For this, it suﬃces to extend the type space. It is
also worth noting that an ex-post equilibrium is a minimax regret equilibrium
with the particularity that the regret is nil. In a work in progress, Renou
(2007) considers the problem of implementing social choice sets in minimax
regret equilibrium and uses the former observation to provide conditions for
implementing social choice sets in ex-post equilibrium.19 Along the same
lines, Hayashi (2007b) studies minimax regret equilibria of auction games
and shows the possibility of over and under bidding.20 A slight variant of
Deﬁnition 2 already appeared in computer science e.g., Hyaﬁl and Boutilier
(2004). Lastly, let us consider a simple example. There are two players 1 and
2. Player 2 has two types θ2 and θ′
2, player 1 has no type and Π1 = ∆({θ2,θ′
2})











19Bergeman and Morris (2007) provide suﬃcient conditions for full implementation in
ex-post equilibrium.
20In Hayashi, Πi is a singleton for each player. However, since payoﬀs are discontinuous,
minimax regret equilibria diﬀer from Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
35It is easy to see that (s1 = a,(s2(θ2) = a,s2(θ′
2))) is a minimax regret equi-
librium, while it is not a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if the probability of the
type θ2 is smaller than 1/4.
Minimal regret equilibrium. As already alluded, the concept of an
ε-minimax regret equilibrium might be the basis for equilibrium reﬁnement.
Indeed, from Proposition 3, letting ε going to zero makes it possible to select
among Nash equilibria. Equilibrium selection is not our primary aim, but the
following oﬀers such an equilibrium selection along with a short discussion
for the interested readers.
Deﬁnition 3 A proﬁle of strategy σ∗ is a minimal regret equilibrium if there
exist some sequences (εk)k∈N and (σ∗
k)k∈N such that
• For all k ∈ N, εk > 0 and limk→+∞εk = 0.
• For all k ∈ N, σ∗
k is an εk-minimax regret equilibrium, and
• limk→+∞σ∗
k = σ∗.
It follows from the existence of an ε-minimax regret equilibrium for each
ε and the compactness of Σ that a minimal regret equilibrium exists. More-
over, we have seen in example G4 that this concept helps to select even
among undominated Nash equilibria. From example G3, we also have that
dominated Nash equilibria might be minimal regret equilibria. The reader
might ﬁnd this property rather unsatisfactory, and we would have agreed
before working on this project. Indeed, if players cautiously believe that all
their opponents’ actions can be played, say because of trembles, then it is
not optimal to play dominated actions. However, players are also excessively
cautious, albeit diﬀerently, in our formulation. They believe that the worst
possible trembles would materialize i.e., the trembles that maximize a player
regret. There is no clear justiﬁcation for one form of cautiousness over an-
other and, therefore, do not feel troubled with this feature of a minimal regret
equilibrium. Hence, a minimal regret equilibrium might be neither perfect
nor proper. The converse also holds true. For instance, consider the game
G5.
36a b c
a 1,1 0,0 −1,−2
b 0,0 0,0 0,−2
c −2,−1 −2,0 −2,−2
G5
The action proﬁle (b,b) is a perfect and proper equilibrium of G5 (van
Damme p15), but is not a minimal regret equilibrium. Consequently, the set
of minimal regret equilibria is neither a subset nor a superset of the set of
perfect (or proper) equilibria.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a solution concept, minimax regret equilib-
rium, where players are uncertain about the conjectures of their opponents
and rationality. A parametric variant of our solution concept, an ε-minimax
regret equilibrium, where uncertainty is modeled as ε-contaminations, is par-
ticularly appealing and intuitive. In an ε-minimax regret equilibrium, players
have, with probability 1−ε, correct conjectures about their opponents’ play.
This speciﬁcation greatly simpliﬁes the computation of equilibria and most
importantly for applications, one can study how the equilibrium predictions
change as the degree of uncertainty varies. Nash equilibria are ε-minimax
regret equilibria with ε = 0. Remarkably, however, our predictions are more
than a simple perturbation of the standard game theoretic outcomes when
ε = 0. For instance, in the model of price competition with two identical
ﬁrms, we show that even the slightest shadow of doubt about the behavior
of a competitor creates a dramatic increase in equilibrium prices. Moreover,
our prediction is essentially unique. Relaxing the assumptions of common
knowledge in conjectures and mutual knowledge in rationality does not nec-
essarily imply a loss of predictive power. We therefore believe that relaxing
these assumptions might proved particularly important in explaining eco-
nomic and social phenomenons. Although further research is still required,
our model explains price dispersion in price-setting environments, which is
largely consistent with empirical and experimental observations (Baye and
37Morgan (2004)).
Finally, we like to mention two issues, which we believe deserves further
research. First, it would be nice to extend the concept of minimax regret
equilibrium to extensive-form games. Hayashi (2007c) seems to be a good
starting point. Second, we like to have a theory of learning of minimax regret
equilibrium.
References
[1] Frank J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann, A Deﬁnition of Subjective
Probability, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1963, 34, pp. 199-205.
[2] Robert J. Aumann and Adam Brandenburger, Epistemic Conditions for
Nash Equilibrium, Econometrica, 1995, 63, pp. 1161-1180.
[3] Ralph Bayer and Ludovic Renou, Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo
Strategicus at the Laboratory, Mimeo, University of Leicester, April
2008.
[4] Pierpaolo Battigalli, Comportamento Razionale ed equilibrio nei giochi
e nelle situazioni sociali, unpublished dissertation, 1987.
[5] Michael Baye and John Morgan, Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the
Internet: Theory and Evidence, Rand Journal of Economics, 2004, 35,
pp. 449-466.
[6] Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, Ex Post Implementation, forth-
coming in Games and Economic Behavior.
[7] Dirk Bergemann and Karl H Schlag, Robust Monopoly Pricing: The
Case of Regret, 2005, Working Paper, European University Institute,
EUI ECO 2005/10.
[8] , Pricing without Priors, 2007a, forthcoming in Journal of the Eu-
ropean Economic Association.
38[9] Douglas Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, Econometrica,
1984, 52, pp. 1007-1028.
[10] Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel, Rationazability and Correlated
Equilibria, Econometrica, 1987, 55, pp. 1391-1402.
[11] Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory, 2003, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
[12] Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences
with Simple Tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, pp. 817-
869.
[13] Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114, pp. 817-868.
[14] Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine, Self-Conﬁrming Equilibrium,
Econometrica, 1993,61, pp. 523-545.
[15] Peter Klibanoﬀ, Uncertainty, Decision, and Normal-form Games,
Mimeo, July 1996.
[16] Takashi Hayashi, Regret Aversion and Opportunity Dependence, 2007a,
to appear in Journal of Economic Theory.
[17] , Sealed-bid Auctions with Regret Averse Bidders, Mimeo, 2007b.
[18] , Dynamic Choice with Anticipated Regret, Mimeo, 2007c.
[19] Hyaﬁl and Boutilier, Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for
Games with Strictly Type Uncertainty, Proceedings of the Twentieth
Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 2004, pp.
268-277.
[20] Peter B. Linhart, Bargaining Solutions with Non-standard Objectives,
Review of Economic-Design, 2001, 6, pp. 225-39.
[21] Peter B. Linhart and Roy Radner, Minimax-regret Strategies for Bar-
gaining over Several Variables, Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48,
pp. 152-178.
39[22] Kin Chung Lo, Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty, Journal of
Economic Theory, 1996, 71, pp. 443-484.
[23] Itzalk Gilboa and David Schmeidler, Maxmin Expected Utility with
Non-unique priors, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989, 18, pp.
133-173.
[24] Massimo Marinacci, Ambiguous Games, Games and Economic Behavior,
2000, 31, pp. 191-219.
[25] John Milnor, Games against Nature. In R. Thrall, C. Coombs and R.
Davis (Eds), Decision Processes. London: John Wiley, 1954, pp. 49-60.
[26] Stephen Morris, The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory,
Economics and Philosophy, 1995, 11, pp. 227-253.
[27] Sujoy Mukerji, A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form When
Rationality is not Common Knowledge, Mimeo, 1995.
[28] Roger Myerson, Reﬁnements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept, Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 1978, 8, pp. 73-80.
[29] David Pearce, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of
Perfection, Econometrica, 1984, 52, pp. 1029-1050.
[30] Clemens Puppe and Karl Schlag, Choice under Complete Uncertainty
when Outcome Spaces are State-Dependent, 2007, forthcoming in The-
ory and Decision.
[31] Philipp J. Reny, On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games, Econometrica, 1999, 67, pp. 1029-
1056.
[32] Leonard J. Savage, The Theory of Statistical Decision, Journal of Amer-
ican Statistical Association, 1951, 46, pp. 55-67.
[33] Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Trade oﬀ Con-
trast and Extremeness Aversion, Journal of Marketing Research, 1992,
29, pp. 281-295.
40[34] Joerg Stoye, Statistical Decisions under Ambiguity, New York Univer-
sity, 2007a.
[35] , Axioms for Minimax Regret Choice Correspondences, New York
University, 2007b.
[36] Eric van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd Edi-
tion, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
41